Ghanaian women's experiences of unsuccessful in-vitro fertilisation treatment, unravelling their meanings: a Heideggerian hermeneutic phenomenological study.

BACKGROUND: Women having experienced infertility over a period usually decide on an option for an invitro fertilisation treatment (IVF). However, in the quest to seek help and to be part of motherhood, they sometimes become unsuccessful in their fertility journey. The researchers aimed to explore the meanings and emotions attached to infertility and unsuccessful invitro fertilisation (IVF) treatment among Ghanaian women, as this area of inquiry is less explored in Africa and specifically in the Ghanaian context. METHODS: The study followed a qualitative approach and drew inspiration from the Heideggerian phenomenological philosophy and design. Six (6) women, aged between 29 and 40 years, who had experienced at least one unsuccessful IVF cycle, were purposefully selected from a private specialist fertility hospital in Kumasi, Ghana. One-on-one interviews were conducted with the participants, and the interviews were transcribed verbatim. The collected data was analyzed using Van Manen six-step framework, which helped to uncover the existential meanings and interpretations these women ascribed to their experiences. RESULTS: The results of the study revealed four main themes that were deemed essential aspects of meaning for the participants. These themes were: (1) Experiencing an Existential Faith and Hope. The participants described their journey through infertility and invitro fertilisation (IVF) treatment as a profound test of their existential faith and hope finding strength in maintaining a positive outlook despite the challenges and setbacks they faced., (2) Facing up to the Angst: This theme highlights the participants' courage in confronting the emotional dimensions of their struggles. The women acknowledged and confronted their anxieties, fears, and emotional distress associated with their infertility and unsuccessful IVF treatment., (3). Non-disclosedness: This theme refers to the participants' experiences of keeping their struggles with IVF treatment private, often due to societal and cultural factors. (4). Endured feelings of inadequacy of being-in-the-world-of-motherless: Participants expressed feelings of inadequacy, self-doubt, and a sense of being incomplete due to their inability to conceive and fulfill the societal role of motherhood. Their narratives revealed the profound impact of societal expectations on their self-perception and identity. CONCLUSION: The study's findings reveal insights into the experiences and interpretations of infertility and unsuccessful IVF treatment among Ghanaian women. Employing Heideggerian hermeneutics, the research elucidates the diverse existential, emotional, and societal aspects inherent in the struggles of infertility. The multifaceted nature of these women's journeys underscores the significance of a comprehensive approach to infertility care that recognizes the cultural, social, emotional, and existential dimensions of the IVF process. Additionally, the study emphasizes the necessity for culturally sensitive support systems and interventions to address the unique challenges faced by this population.

Can philosophy benefit nurses and/or nursing? Heidegger and Strauss, problems of knowledge and context.

When researchers and scholars claim their work is based on a philosophical idea or a philosopher's corpus of ideas (and theory/theorist can be substituted for philosophy/philosopher), and when 'basing' signifies something significant rather than subsidiary or inconsequential, what level of understanding and expertise can readers reasonably expect authors to possess? In this paper, some of the uses to which philosophical ideas and named philosophers (Martin Heidegger and Leo Strauss) are put in exegesis is critiqued. Considering problematic instances of idea-name use may enable the question: 'Can philosophy benefit nurses and/or nursing?' to be better understood if not answered.

"It'll never end, I'll never go": Representation of Caregiving in Samuel Beckett's Endgame and Footfalls.

Research on the unrepresentability of death in Samuel Beckett's oeuvre abound in Beckett scholarship, but little attention has been given to the artist's representation of caregiving to the dying in his plays. With reference to Martin Heidegger's concept of care and Albert Camus's idea of the absurd, this article analyzes Endgame (1957) and Footfalls (1976) by attending to Beckett's dramatic representation of caregiving as undergirded by a sense of its absurdity. The almost 20-year gap between the writing of both plays highlights the development of an understanding that this sense of absurdity is never about the caregiver's questioning of one's obligation to the dependent but about how one chooses to respond to caregiving as an absurd predicament. The pertinence of such a representation of caregiving by Beckett lies in its poignant articulation of a complex experience that is often left unexpressed by caregivers who prioritize their dependent loved ones over themselves.

It's About Time: Loewald, Lacan, and AprÈs-Coup in America.

Martin Heidegger's thought deeply influenced both Hans Loewald and Jacques Lacan, the catalyst they seemed to have been waiting for. For Loewald, Heidegger's ontological centrality of time to Being-in-the-World would bridge to Freud's centrality of transference to the analytic process, thereby operationalizing transference as a prism of time. In revealing the interwoven correlatives of present-past-future, how they bootstrap one another phenomenologically, Loewald also revealed a spiral of recursive meaning (in essence, après-coup) that draws us into the future, "the something more" of existence. In parallel, through his recognition of the power of après-coup, Lacan rescued from obscurity Freud's profound conception of Nachträglichkeit, or the spiral and causal force of unfolding meaning. Lacan was now situated to bring après-coupin conjunction with Heidegger's Being-in-the-World, with time interwoven into all aspects of existence, thereby underpinning, too, language and the Symbolic Order. By reading Freud through Heidegger and then creating their brilliant syntheses, Loewald and Lacan, through their striking sameness and differences, illuminate the nature of the unconscious, of memory and meaning, of the spiral of time, and of existence itself.

Intercorporeity, Un-Distancing, and Aura in Skype Analysis.

The Covid pandemic has forced analysts around the world, some more than others, to work using Zoom and Skype. The technical innovation is here to stay and raises questions on a theoretical level. Is online analysis 'real' analysis or not? What is lost from the analytical experience? What, if anything, is gained? The global health emergency, on the one hand, has made these questions inescapable; on the other, it has provided a kind of huge experimental field to deal with them. Here, the author argues that when viewed from the perspective of the concepts of intercorporeity (Merleau-Ponty), un-distancing (Heidegger), and aura (Benjamin), some of the issues of 'presence' in teleanalysis become clearer.

Boredom at the border of philosophy: conceptual and ethical issues.

Boredom is a topic in philosophy. Philosophers have offered close descriptions of the experience of boredom that should inform measurement and analysis of empirical results. Notable historical authors include Seneca, Martin Heidegger, and Theodor Adorno; current philosophers have also contributed to the literature. Philosophical accounts differ in significant ways, because each theory of boredom is embedded in a broader understanding of institutions, ethics, and social justice. Empirical research and interventions to combat boredom should be conscious of those frameworks. Philosophy can also inform responses to normative questions, such as whether and when boredom is bad and whether the solution to boredom should involve changing the institutions that are perceived as boring, the ways that these institutions present themselves, or individuals' attitudes and choices.

A Heideggerian analysis of good care in an acute hospital setting: Insights from healthcare workers, patients and families.

This study articulates the relational constituents of good care beyond techno-rational competence. Neoliberal healthcare means that notions of care are readily commodified and reduced to quantifiable assessments and checklists. This novel research investigated accounts of good care provided by nursing, medical, allied and auxiliary staff. The Heideggerian phenomenological study was undertaken in acute medical-surgical wards, investigating the contextual, communicative nature of care. The study involved interviews with 17 participants: 3 previous patients, 3 family members and 11 staff. Data were analysed iteratively, dwelling with stories and writing and rewriting to surface the phenomenality of good care. The data set highlighted the following essential constituents: authentic care: caring encompassing solicitude (fürsorge); impromptu care: caring beyond role category; sustained care: caring beyond specialist parameters; attuned care: caring encompassing family and culture; and insightful care: caring beyond assessment and diagnosis. The findings are clinically significant because they indicate the importance of nurse leaders and educators harnessing the potential capacity of all healthcare workers to participate in good care. Healthcare workers reported that participating in or witnessing good care was uplifting and added meaning to their work, contributing to a sense of shared humanity.

What is Phenomenological Bioethics? A Critical Appraisal of Its Ends and Means.

In recent years the phenomenological approach to bioethics has been rejuvenated and reformulated by, among others, the Swedish philosopher Fredrik Svenaeus. Building on the now-relatively mainstream phenomenological approach to health and illness, Svenaeus has sought to bring phenomenological insights to bear on the bioethical enterprise, with a view to critiquing and refining the "philosophical anthropology" presupposed by the latter. This article offers a critical but sympathetic analysis of Svenaeus' efforts, focusing on both his conception of the ends of phenomenological bioethics and the predominantly Heideggerian means he employs. Doing so reveals certain problems with both. I argue that the main aim of phenomenological bioethics as set out by Svenaeus needs to be reformulated, and that there are important oversights in his approach to reaching this end. I conclude by arguing that to overcome the latter problem we should draw instead on the works of Max Scheler and Hans Jonas.

The Black Foe: Being Towards Death.

The ontology of death is universal, hence archetypal. Nowhere do we witness any organic creature escape its talons. Analytical psychology has had an intimate relationship to death for the simple fact that it contemplates the soul, the numinous, and an afterlife. From Hegel to Heidegger, Freud and Jung, death was an existential force that sustained and transformed life, the positive significance of the negative. Rather than merely a destructive phenomenon, death informs Being, the power of nothingness that dialectically drives life. In this paper, I will introduce the notion of what I call the omega principle, the psychological orientation and trajectory of our being towards death, which we may say is a universal preoccupation and recapitulation of the collective unconscious that subsumes our personal relation to death, an eternal return of the objective psyche constellated as esse in anima.

L'ontologie de la mort est universelle, et ainsi archétypale. Nous ne voyons nulle part une créature organique échapper à son emprise. La psychologie analytique a eu une relation intime avec la mort du simple fait qu'elle contemple l'âme, le numineux et l'au-delà. De Hegel à Heidegger, Freud et Jung, la mort était une force existentielle qui soutenait et transformait la vie, la signification positive du négatif. Plutôt qu'un simple phénomène destructeur, la mort façonne l'Etre ; la puissance du néant qui conduit dialectiquement la vie. Dans cet article, je vais présenter l'idée que j'appelle le principe oméga ; l'orientation et la trajectoire psychologiques de notre être allant vers la mort, dont nous pourrions dire qu'il s'agit d'une préoccupation et d'une récapitulation universelle de l'inconscient collectif, qui englobe notre relation personnelle à la mort, un retour éternel de la psyché objective constellée en tant qu'esse in anima.

La ontología de la muerte es universal, por tanto arquetípica. Ninguna criatura orgánica escapa a sus garras. La psicología analítica ha tenido una relación íntima con la muerte por el simple hecho de que contempla el alma, lo numinoso y una vida después de la muerte. De Hegel a Heidegger, Freud y Jung, la muerte era una fuerza existencial que sostenía y transformaba la vida, el significado positivo de lo negativo. Más que un mero fenómeno destructivo, la muerte informa al Ser, el poder de la nada que impulsa dialécticamente la vida. En este artículo, introduciré la noción de lo que denomino principio omega, la orientación y trayectoria psicológica de nuestro ser hacia la muerte, que podemos decir que es una preocupación y recapitulación universal del inconsciente colectivo que subsume nuestra relación personal con la muerte, un eterno retorno de la psique objetiva constelada como esse in anima.

Meaninglessness and monotony in pandemic boredom.

Boredom is an affective experience that can involve pervasive feelings of meaninglessness, emptiness, restlessness, frustration, weariness and indifference, as well as the slowing down of time. An increasing focus of research in many disciplines, interest in boredom has been intensified by the recent Covid-19 pandemic, where social distancing measures have induced both a widespread loss of meaning and a significant disturbance of temporal experience. This article explores the philosophical significance of this aversive experience of 'pandemic boredom.' Using Heidegger's work as a unique vantage point, this article draws on survey data collected by researchers in an ongoing project titled 'Experiences of Social Distancing During the Covid-19 Pandemic' to give an original phenomenological interpretation of the meaninglessness and monotony of pandemic boredom. On a Heideggerian interpretation, pandemic boredom involves either a situative confrontation with relative meaninglessness that upholds our absorption in the everyday world, or an existential confrontation with absolute meaninglessness that forces us to take up the question of our existence. Arguing that boredom during the pandemic makes this distinction difficult to sustain, I consider some of the ways in which pandemic boredom might be seen to expose and then exceed the distinctive methodological limitations of Heidegger's philosophical interpretation of boredom.

Prevenção do suicídio: esquecimento do ser e era da técnica / Suicide prevention: forgetfulness of being and technical era / Prevención del suicidio: olvido del ser y la era de la técnica

Martin Heidegger, em sua ontologia, destaca uma característica específica da atualidade que atravessa o comportamento humano, na filosofia, na ciência ou no senso comum: o esquecimento do ser. O filósofo diferencia a época atual das demais épocas históricas. O horizonte histórico contemporâneo se desvela por meio do desafio e da exploração, da tentativa de controle e domínio dos acontecimentos, ao modo da disponibilidade e em função da produtividade. O filósofo esclarece que todo esse desenraizamento do homem atual está atrelado ao esquecimento daquilo que é o mais essencial, qual seja, a existência. A questão que norteia este estudo é apurar, por meio das referências de Heidegger e dos estudos sobre suicídio, o quanto a interpretação da morte voluntária nos dias atuais está atravessada por tal esquecimento. Pretendemos investigar o quanto as ações de prevenção desenvolvidas pela suicidologia se encontram atravessadas por tal esquecimento do ser do homem e, dessa forma, acabam por estabelecer relações entre ser e ente em uma consequente redução ao ente como invariante e atemporal. O caminho para investigar a questão iniciará por abordar, em maiores detalhes, a analítica existencial, a questão da técnica e o movimento de esquecimento do ser apontados por Heidegger a fim de problematizar as perspectivas científicas atuais sobre o suicídio em sua prevenção para, então, estabelecer uma compreensão fenomenológica e existencial sobre o referido fenômeno.(AU)

Martin Heidegger, in his ontology, highlights a specific characteristic of the present moment that crosses human behavior, in philosophy, science, or common sense: the forgetfulness of being. The philosopher differentiates the current age from other historical ages. The contemporary historical horizon is unveiled by the challenge and the exploration, from the attempt to control and dominate events, to the mode of standing reserve and in terms of productivity. The philosopher clarifies that all this uprooting of the current man is linked to the forgetfulness of what is the most essential, namely, the existence itself. The question that guides this study is to investigate, via Heidegger's references and studies on suicide, to what extent the interpretation of voluntary death today is crossed by such forgetfulness. We intend to investigate to what extent the prevention actions developed by suicidology are crossed by such forgetfulness of the human's being and, in this way, they end up establishing relationships between being and entity in a consequent reduction to entity as an invariant and timeless. The path to investigate the issue will start by addressing, in greater detail, the existential analytics, the question concerning technique and the movement of forgetting the being pointed out by Heidegger to problematize the current scientific perspectives on suicide and its prevention to, then, propose a phenomenological and existential understanding about the referred phenomenon.(AU)

Martin Heidegger en su ontología destaca una característica específica del presente que atraviesa el comportamiento humano, ya sea en la filosofía, la ciencia o el sentido común: el olvido del ser. El filósofo diferencia la época actual de otras épocas históricas. El horizonte histórico contemporáneo se devela el desafío y la exploración, el intento de controlar y dominar los eventos, en la modalidad de disponibilidad y en términos de productividad. Y así aclara que todo este desarraigo del hombre actual está involucrado en el olvido de lo más esencial, que es la existencia misma. A partir de las referencias a Heidegger y de los estudios sobre el suicidio, este estudio busca saber hasta qué punto la interpretación de la muerte voluntaria hoy está atravesada por este olvido. Pretendemos investigar en qué medida las acciones de prevención desarrolladas por la suicidología se encuentran atravesadas por el olvido del ser del hombre y, de esta manera, terminan por establecer relaciones entre el ser y el ente, en una consecuente reducción al ente como invariante y atemporal. Para investigar el tema se abordará inicialmente, con mayor detalle, la analítica existencial, la cuestión de la técnica y el movimiento del olvido del ser señalado por Heidegger para problematizar las perspectivas científicas actuales sobre el suicidio y su prevención y, luego, proponer una comprensión fenomenológica y existencial sobre el referido fenómeno.(AU)

On Moral Nose.

There are many authors who consider the so-called "moral nose" a valid epistemological tool in the field of morality. The expression was used by George Orwell, following in Friedrich Nietzsche's footsteps and was very clearly described by Leo Tolstoy. It has also been employed by authors such as Elisabeth Anscombe, Bernard Williams, Noam Chomsky, Stuart Hampshire, Mary Warnock, and Leon Kass. This article examines John Harris' detailed criticism of what he ironically calls the "olfactory school of moral philosophy." Harris' criticism is contrasted with Jonathan Glover's defense of the moral nose. Glover draws some useful distinctions between the various meanings that the notion of moral nose can assume. Finally, the notion of moral nose is compared with classic notions such as Aristotelian phronesis, Heideggerian aletheia, and the concept of "sentiment" proposed by the philosopher Thomas Reid. The conclusion reached is that morality cannot be based only on reason, or-as David Hume would have it-only on feelings.

El problema de la muerte propia: reflexiones entre filosofía y psicoanálisis / The problem of one's own death: reflections between philosophy and psychoanalysis

Resumen Este artículo se propone retomar el problema de la muerte propia, aquella que Freud consideró como imposible de representar. Este trabajo apunta a mostrar que, aunque sea irrepresentable, el análisis puede y debe producir un cierto saber sobre la muerte. Se toma como base la idea lacaniana de que una ética del deseo obliga al sujeto a entrar en ese lugar que el autor llamó "entre dos muertes" y que hace de la muerte simbólica un dato previo a la muerte real. Se revisan los aportes de Sócrates y Heidegger sobre la posición ética frente a la muerte propia, con el propósito de mostrar las convergencias y divergencias entre estos autores y Lacan. Finalmente, con el objetivo de mostrar que existen observables clínicos de que el análisis produce un cambio de posición a este respecto, se examinan los sueños de varios psicoanalistas que han publicado el relato de su experiencia de análisis. Se concluye que los indicadores de este cambio de posición son principalmente el planteo del tema de los asuntos pendientes y la necesidad de los actos resolutivos.

Abstract This article approaches the issue of one's own death, the one considered by Freud as something impossible to represent. This paper has as a purpose to show that, although unrepresentable, analysis can and should generate certain knowledge about death. The Lacanian idea is taken as a basis that an ethic of desire forces the subject to enter that place called by the author "between two deaths" that turns symbolic death a prior data to real death. The contributions of Socrates and Heidegger on the ethical position towards one's own death are reviewed, in order to show the convergences and divergences between these authors and Lacan. Finally, aiming at showing there are clinical facts that indicate that the analysis produces a change of position in this regard, the dreams of several psychoanalysts who have published their experience of analysis are examined. It is concluded that the indicators for this change of position are mainly the issue statement of unresolved matters and the need for resolutive acts.

Coping and Adapting to Climate Change in Australia: Yoga Perspectives.

Scientists caution against ignoring human-induced climate change and related health repercussions, with a growing body of literature highlighting the mental health effects of climate change and the importance of understanding coping and adaptation strategies. Less is known, however, about sustainable personal practices fortifying mental health in the context of climate change. The present study sought to investigate how long-term yoga practitioners (yoga therapists or yoga teachers) in Australia with a lived experience of climate change-related events are coping and adapting. The aim was to better understand participants' reports of climate change-related experiences and how yoga influences their mental health and choices in the face of climate change. Eleven in-depth telephone interviews were conducted and analyzed using an interpretive phenomenological methodology. Participants reported that their ongoing relationship with yoga influences how they cope with climate change-related stressors and their being-in-the-world, and how concern for all life bolsters their responses to climate change. The results illustrate the part yoga may play in supporting long-term practitioners to prepare for, cope with, and respond to climate change events and impacts. Offering inclusive, interdisciplinary yoga therapy and community-based networks fostering ethical living and response flexibility may prove beneficial not only for the mental health and coping ability of participants, but for the planet.

Issues for a phenomenology of illness - transgressing psychologizations : Author.

Phenomenology of illness has grown increasingly popular in recent times. However, the most prominent phenomenologists of illness defend a psychologizing notion of phenomenology, which argues that illness is primarily constituted by embodied experiences, feelings, and emotions of suffering, alienation etc. The article argues that this gives rise to three issues that need to be addressed. (1) How is the theory of embodiment compatible with the strong distinction between disease and illness? (2) What is the difference between problematic embodiment and illness? (3) How is existential edification, that illness can give rise to according to the phenomenologists, to be understood? The article then engages in an analysis of Heidegger's and Waldenfels' phenomenology with the ambition of developing a notion of existence, which can transgress the psychologization of illness. Rather than arguing that illness is constituted by experiences of suffering and alienation, it emphasizes that broaches upon conatively guided activities constitute illness.

Concepção de ser humano na Clínica Ampliada: uma proposta de orientação analítico-existencial / Expanded Clinic conception of human being: an existential-analytical approach / Concepción del ser humano en la Clínica Ampliada: una proposición analítico-existencial

A Clínica Ampliada é uma das diretrizes que a Política Nacional de Huma-nização propõe, a fim de qualificar o modo de se fazer saúde pública. Está fundamentada em ideias que remetem à revisão do entendimento tradicional da saúde, o qual privilegia doença, sintoma e cura, objetivismo positivista e intervenção prioritariamente orgânica. Como alternativa, a Clínica Ampliada propõe a valorização do humano em seu contexto e em sua história de vida. O artigo desenvolve o pensamento de que a essa ampliação da clínica subjaz uma concepção de ser humano, uma vez que a caracterização de qualquer fenômeno humano implica um entendimento a respeito de como é o humano. Argumenta-se que a concepção analítico-existencial de ser humano, elabo-rada pelo filósofo Martin Heidegger, é compatível com a visão de ser humano implícita na abordagem da Clínica Ampliada à saúde, uma vez que também amplia a visão tradicional de ser humano, ao descrevê-lo como ser-no-mundo.

The Expanded Clinic is one of the National Humanization Policy's guidelines, which aims to improve the public healthcare. It is based on ideas that rethink traditional healthcare which is characterized by emphasis on diseases, symp-toms and cure, positivistic objectivity and primarily organic intervention. Alternatively, The Expanded Clinic approach highlights the priority of valuing the human in its context and in its life history. The article unfolds arguing that rethinking traditional healthcare practices implies an underlying conception of human being, since the definition of any human phenomenon is related to an understanding of what it is to be human. It is stated that Martin Heidegger's existential-analytical conception of human being is in line with the implicit vision of human being of the Expanded Clinic's approach, in so far as it broa-dens the long-established conception of the human being by describing it as being-in-the-world.

La Clínica Ampliada es uno de los lineamientos que propone la Política Nacional de Humanización, para calificar la forma de hacer salud pública; se basa en ideas que se refieren a la revisión de la comprensión tradicional de la salud, que privilegia la enfermedad, el síntoma y la cura, el objetivismo positivista y la intervención principalmente orgánica. Como alternativa, la Clínica Ampliada propone valorar al humano en su contexto y en su historia de vida. El artículo desarrolla el pensamiento de que a esta revisión subyace una concepción del ser humano, una vez que la caracterización de cualquier fenómeno humano implica un entendimiento de cómo es el ser humano. Se propone que la concepción analítico-existencial del ser humano, elaborada por el filósofo Martín Heidegger, es compatible con la visión del ser humano implícita en la abordaje de la Clínica Ampliada, ya que también expande la visión tradicional del ser humano, al describirlo como un ser-en-el-mundo.

Violentar el pensamiento médico: la revolución de la bioética en la medicina / TO VIOLENT THE MEDICAL THINKING: THE REVOLUTION OF BIOETHICS IN MEDICINE

En el presente trabajo presentamos otra mirada del acontecer del hombre en el mundo de las Ciencias Biológicas, especialmente, en el mundo de la Medicina. Trazamosun paralelismo entre el pensamiento de Martín Heidegger con respecto a la diferencia ontológica entre el ser y ente y lo ocurrido dentro del mundo médico a partir del olvido del ser en el hombre padeciente. En este camino, nos proponemos realizar una reflexión antropológica desde el origen de la Medicina hasta nuestros días y exponer el devenir que sufrió la figura del ser y su enteque derivó en un privilegio a este último en detrimento del primero. Para ello, describimos un brevísimo bosquejo de la Medicina Hipocrática y de su visión del médico que se enfocaba a la atención tanto del ser como del ente del hombre. Luego analizamos el estudio de la etapa médica posterior en la cual aparece el olvido del ser del ente/hombre/enfermo. Desde allí surge un movimiento iniciado en los años 70 del siglo pasado, el movimiento bioético, que despierta un nuevo acontecer del hombre en el mundo de las Ciencias Biológicas respetando su autonomía

In the present work I take another look at the way man happens in the world of Biological Sciences, especially in the world of Medicine. I draw a parallel between the thought of Martín Heidegger regarding the ontological difference between being and being and what happened within the medical world from the forgetting of being in the suffering man. Along this path, I propose to carry out an anthropological reflection from the origin of Medicine to the present day and expose the evolution suffered by the figure of the being and the entity of it that resulted in a privilege to the latter to the detriment of the former. To do this, I describe a very brief sketch of Hippocratic Medicine and its vision of the doctor that focused on the attention of both the being and the being of man. Ten I analyze the study of the later medical stage, in which, the forgetfulness of the being of the entity / man / sick appears. From there arises a movement started in the 70s of the last century, called the bioethical movement, which awakens a new happening of man in the world of Biological Sciences while respecting his autonomy

"We're protecting them to death"-A Heideggerian interpretation of loneliness among older adults in long-term care facilities during COVID-19: Contact details.

In this paper, I draw on Heidegger's phenomenology of "moods" (Stimmungen) to interpret loneliness as a diffused and atmospheric feeling-state that often undergirds the lives of older adults, shaping the ways in which they are attuned to and make sense of the world. I focus specifically on residents in long-term care facilities to show how the social isolation and lockdown measures of the COVID-19 pandemic dramatically intensified the mood. The aim is to shed light on how profound and totalizing the experience has been for residents. Making use of Heidegger's account of the affective "collapse" or "breakdown" (Zusammenbruch) of meaning, I argue that when older adults are functionally locked in their rooms for months at a time and cut off from the orienting routines and rhythms of the relational world, the result is a crumbling of the fundamental meaning-structures that constitute subjectivity. The global sense of abandonment and disconnection strips away the possibility for self-understanding, and residents are often left confused and abandoned to an existence that has been drained of meaning and significance.

Phenomenologically-Informed Cancer Care: An Entryway into the Art of Medicine.

There has been increased interest in what the philosophical subdiscipline of phenomenology can contribute to medical humanities due to its dual emphases on practicality and its attempt to understand the experience of others, thus positioning it as a potentially helpful conceptual toolkit to guide clinical care. Using various figures from the phenomenological tradition, most prominently Martin Heidegger and Martin Buber, the authors illuminate relevant philosophical concepts, employ them in various examples, and provide three principles revolving around empathy, communication, and listening to patients' individual values to guide medical professionals who practice the art of medicine in cancer care settings.

Inner Conflict of Personality in the Paradigm of Existential-Phenomenological Ontology.

This article analyzes the problem of internal personality conflicts from the the standpoint of existential-phenomenological ontology. The article presents a theoretical substantiation of phenomenological ontology as a nonclassical paradigm in the human sciences to solve existential conflicts in personality. It is noted that the main models of internal conflict do not give a satisfactory answer to the question of psychogenesis and psychological mechanisms for resolving existential conflicts. It is emphasized that it is perspective to analyze internal conflicts, relying upon phenomenological ontology and the existential approach. The main provisions of phenomenological ontology presented in the works of Husserl and Heidegger, as the founders of this scientific direction, are considered in a psychological context. A classification of existential experiences of a difficult life world is proposed, depending on the intra- and inter-orientation of mental processes. The concepts of the self-closing life world, ambivalent Other, ambivalent intentionality, spontaneous involvement are introduced, making it possible to substantiate a conceptual model for resolving existential personality conflicts. It is concluded that the resolution of existential conflicts is associated with the feeling of an intersubjective life-world, in which the ambivalent Other and spontaneous bodily involvement play a primary role.